Research Areas

Surveillance Games:

The Politics of International Detection

Public agencies engage in International Detection Cooperation (IDC) to address a wide range of transnational issues, ranging from money laundering to disease outbreak. Often, however, IDC is slow, siloed, and features perverse incentives, undermining effective detection. To understand why, this project formulates and tests a new theoretical framework of IDC politics. The dissertation version focuses on the manner in which regulators cooperate to detect insider trading and market manipulation perpetrated across borders. Empirical evidence is collected from elite interviews with practitioners in 13 countries and various archives, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Archive and the Library of the Ontario Securities Commission. Future iterations will expand the analysis to other issues areas such as money laundering and the moderation of social media platforms.

Related Publications:

  • (2020). Market Structure and Disempowering Regulatory Intermediaries, Regulation & Governance [Link]

Strategy and Conflict in

International Organizations

Since the end of World War II, the number of International Organizations (IOs) has exploded. IOs play an essential role facilitating cooperation between states, private firms, and non-governmental organizations. But they are also arenas of conflict. Who wins and who loses? When and why do actors become dissatisfied with the procedures of IOs and the distribution of their resources? What explains the proliferation of IOs with overlapping functions and jurisdictions? And how does the corporate governance of these institutions impact their performance?

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Related Publications:

  • (2018). The Proliferation of Multilateral Development Banks, The Review of International Organizations [Link]

  • (2015). Effective Leadership in International Organizations (with Ngaire Woods, Shubhra Saxena Kabra, Nina Hall, Yulia Taranova, Hugo Batten), The World Economic Forum [Link]

Global Capital Markets: 

Market Structure and Algorithmic Trading 

Capital markets have transformed beyond recognition. Face-to-face interactions on exchange floors have been replaced by electronic exchanges and the extensive use of algorithmic and high-frequency execution strategies. What are the consequences of these changes for retail and institutional investors? How consistent are these changes across different asset classes, such as foreign exchange and cryptocurrencies? What are the primary regulatory issues and how can they be most effectively addressed?

Related Publications:

  • (2019). The FX Race to Zero: Electronification and Market Structural Issues in Foreign Exchange Trading (with Dan Marcus), Global Algorithmic Capital Markets, Oxford University Press [Link]

  • (2019). Changing Capital Market Structure and Regulatory Challenges: Trends in Equity and Foreign Exchange Markets (with Walter Mattli), The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Market Regulation [Link]

©2021 Miles Kellerman