The Politics of Global Detection
My primary research project examines the political economy of detecting financial crime. The detection of financial crime is a prime example of multi-level governance, in which states, private firms, and international organizations engage in a complex array of institutional arrangements to spot nefarious activity. We know little, however, about what drives this variation, who wins and who loses, and the resulting impact on states’ capacity to effectively combat illicit finance. I address these questions by presenting a new framework to explain variation in global monitoring arrangements. My Ph.D. thesis evaluates this framework against five case studies on the detection of market abuse, drawing on archival evidence, 86 interviews, and documents obtained via a Freedom of Information Act Request. The results corroborate the framework’s expectations, and I am now focused on expanding the analysis to additional issue areas such as money laundering and the wild west of cryptocurrencies.
(2020). Market Structure and Disempowering Regulatory Intermediaries, Regulation & Governance [Link]
Since the end of World War II, the number of International Organizations (IOs) has exploded. IOs play an essential role facilitating cooperation between states, private firms, and non-governmental organizations. But they are also arenas of conflict. Who wins and who loses? Why do actors become dissatisfied with the procedures of IOs and the distribution of their resources? What explains the proliferation of IOs with overlapping functions and jurisdictions? And how does the corporate governance of these institutions impact their performance? My research explores these questions in the context of multilateral development banks, drawing on archival research and extensive interviews in London, Washington, D.C., and Manila, Philippines.
Market Structure and Algorithmic Trading
Markets for trading equities, currencies, and other financial instruments have transformed beyond recognition. Face-to-face trading on exchange floors have been replaced by electronic exchanges and the extensive use of algorithmic and high-frequency execution strategies. What are the consequences of these changes for retail and institutional investors? How consistent are these changes across different asset classes? What are the primary regulatory issues associated with these developments and how can they be most effectively addressed? My work investigates these (and other) questions, both with respect to traditional asset classes and new frontiers of cryptocurrencies and non-fungible assets.
(2019). The FX Race to Zero: Electronification and Market Structural Issues in Foreign Exchange Trading (with Dan Marcus), Global Algorithmic Capital Markets, Oxford University Press [Link]
(2019). Changing Capital Market Structure and Regulatory Challenges: Trends in Equity and Foreign Exchange Markets (with Walter Mattli), The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Market Regulation [Link]