​

Over the last 30 years, capital markets have become increasingly global, fragmented, and fast-paced. This has created new opportunities for nefarious actors to engage in sophisticated, transnational schemes to manipulate prices or trade on the basis of inside information. Nevertheless, international cooperation on surveillance is limited and inconsistent. To understand why, I construct a novel, two-level game model that seeks to anticipate the form of cooperation regulators choose. Empirical evidence is drawn from archival material; proprietary quantitative data; documents obtained via a Freedom of Information Act Request; and extensive interviews in Oxford, London, Toronto, New York, Washington, D.C., Amsterdam, The Hague, Paris, Bonn and Frankfurt. 

​

International organizations (IOs) play an integral role in facilitating cooperation between states, private-sector firms, and non-state actors. But they are also arenas of conflict. When and why do actors become dissatisfied with the procedures of IOs and the distribution of their resources? What explains the proliferation of IOs with overlapping functions and jurisdictions? How does the corporate governance of IOs affect their internal politics and performance?

Capital markets have transformed beyond recognition. Face-to-face interactions on exchange floors have been replaced by electronic exchanges and the extensive use of algorithmic and high-frequency execution strategies. What are the consequences of these changes for retail and institutional investors? How consistent are these changes across different asset classes, such as foreign exchange and cryptocurrencies? What are the regulatory issues and how can they be addressed?